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Rausser, G. C. and S.R. Johnson (1993). 'State-market-civil institutions: The case of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics'. World Development 21(4): 675-689.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-45BC32G-3Y/2/473e942d3233b0be6d02697e808ae481
The transition tasks facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are monumental. The public sector will play a dominant role during the transition process. Available evidence suggests that orthodox prescriptions for public sector reform cannot be effectively implemented without an underlying constitution and a legal and regulatory infrastructure (LRI). A well-designed constitution and LRI instill confidence and policy credibility. With perfectly rational expectations and confidence in the constitution and LRI, the sequence of reforms matters little; future reforms are perfectly anticipated today and agents act as though the reforms will occur with certainty. Short of such confidence, reforms need to be simultaneously pursued on many fronts. The most important activity is to redefine the role of the state, setting a constitution that clearly defines and secures basic political, civil, and economic freedoms and designing an LRI that creates a fertile environment for a vibrant market economy.

Barbara Harriss-White, B. (1995). 'The changing public role in services to food and agriculture : The legal regulation of food markets in India'. Food Policy 20(6): 585-596.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCB-3YCDW8K-C/2/7aae98d617edc0344d05d703434c641d
A framework allowing the commercial transfer of property rights is an essential prerequisite to market exchange widely considered the prerogative of the state. Here, the social history of the legal regulation of agricultural markets in central, south and northeast India is examined. Regulatory law is shown to be riven with unanticipated outcomes, working as intended only under rare conditions of competition and absence of preharvest commercial debt. Meso level institutions of collective action and micro level behaviour by firms also regulate exchange, unsystematically according to their multiple objectives. Foreign funded projects and another layer of customary procedure. In the light of this analysis, the current policy debates over agricultural market reform are discussed and an analytical framework and suggestions for reform are offered.

Eggertsson, T. (1997). 'The old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism'. World Development 25(8): 1187-1203.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-3SX1GPR-2/2/9231075d18ccdedada56318d85f67822
In economics, recent emphasis on institutions suggests new policy dimensions for the traditional theory of economic policy which originated with Tinbergen and others at the time of the Keynesian revolution. The paper presents elements of the traditional view--instruments, targets, and policy models--and then considers new aspects of policy, especially policy for structural change. The discussion emphasizes the implications for institutional design of incomplete knowledge, and endogenous politics. Both public and private actors rely on incomplete policy models, and the models themselves can become (intermediate) targets of policy.

Ashton, T. (1998). 'Contracting for health services in New Zealand: A transaction cost analysis, Social Science & Medicine 46(3): 357-367.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBF-3SX5H61-17/2/3b8f3118d2524c6657c913b34984efc2
The splitting of the functions of purchaser and provider in the New Zealand health system in 1993 necessitated the use of explicit contracts between the two parties. This paper examines contracting experiences during the first two years of operation. The study focuses on four services: rest homes, primary care clinics, surgical services, and acute mental health services. The insights of transaction cost economics form the theoretical framework. The objective of this study was to examine whether the transaction costs associated with contracting vary across the four different services, and whether different types of contracts and contractual relationships are emerging as transactors attempt to reduce these costs. Information was collected in a series of 53 interviews with purchasers and providers, together with any relevant documentation. The results suggest that the costs of contracting are indeed greater for some services than for others. Other variables such as the style of negotiations, the type and specificity of contracts and the degree of monitoring also differ across the four services. At this early stage of the reform process, there was little evidence that purchasers and providers were attempting to reduce transaction costs by negotiating more flexible, longer-term, relational contracts. The main benefit from contracting to date has been improved accountability of service providers.

McCormick, D. (1999). 'African Enterprise Clusters and Industrialization: Theory and Reality'. World Development 27(9): 1531-1551.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-3X3BXDT-3/2/432fa3b1c82bf3d889d721188993171c
Using six case studies from Africa, this paper examines the theoretical argument that geographic and sectoral clustering enables enterprises to overcome constraints to growth and development. Findings were both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the study underscored the strength of the collective efficiency framework, but found that certain anomalies could only be explained by other contextual variables. Grouping the six case studies revealed important differences among them, and showed that each group plays its own part in the industrialization process. 'Groundwork' clusters prepare the way; 'industrializing' clusters begin the process of specialization, differentiation, and technological development; and 'complex industrial' clusters produce competitively for wider markets. The paper concludes with practical implications for African governments, donors, and the business community.

van der Meer-Kooistra, J. and Ed G. J. Vosselman (2000). 'Management control of interfirm transactional relationships: the case of industrial renovation and maintenance'. Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(1): 51-77.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCK-3Y0RB21-4/2/ce2286602822945cba66a4e52492e727
This paper is focused on the way in which interfirm relations can be drawn up and controlled. Drawing on contracting theories a model is built of the management control structure of interfirm relationships. The model consists of three control patterns and of contingency factors that influence the choices between the patterns. Particular attention is paid to the role of trust. In building our model we take the perspective of the outsourcer. We try to refine our model by conducting case research in the field of industrial renovation and industrial maintenance. In this field we observed changes in the way outsourcing relationships are controlled. Case research can be very helpful for gaining insights into factors that influence the establishment of control structures of interfirm relationships. By comparing the results of our case research we found institutional, strategic, cultural and historical factors to be of great importance for these control structures.

Chang, H. J. (2000). 'The Hazard of Moral Hazard: Untangling the Asian Crisis'. World Development 28(4): 775-788.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-3YRVR07-C/2/4ea086b256d1c5c4384ce44b9646dcd8

The paper critically examines the explanations of the Asian crisis which emphasize the role of national policies and institutions that allegedly created moral hazard by overprotecting the investors--industrial policy, crony capitalism, and government guarantees accorded to banks and industrial firms that are considered too important to fail. We also discuss the international dimension of the moral hazard argument in the presence of International Monetary Fund (IMF) bail-out. The paper finds these explanations theoretically ill-defined and empirically weak, and argues that the prescriptions for changes in policy and institutions based on them are unlikely to prevent similar kinds of crises in the future.