フツーの人のためのフツーの勉強

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  • Islam, N. (1993). "Public enterprise reform: Managerial autonomy, accountability and performance contracts." Public Administration & Development 13(2): 129-152.

The underlying assumption in this paper is that autonomy and accountability are both fundamental prerequisites for the effective functioning of state-owned enterprises. The paper first examines the traditional, dichotomous approach to the autonomy-accountability conundrum. This approach posits the relationship as process oriented, pervasive, quantitative and based on a priori controls. A more recent view of control and accountability as a posteriori, qualitative, strategic, results-oriented and non-zero sum is then briefly analysed. The paper presents a review of the theory and practice of performance contracts (PC) as tools to implement the latter approach. Three basic models of PCs--Senegal's contrat plan, Pakistan's signalling system and India's memorandum of understanding--have been analysed, comparing the negotiating process, major players, substantive elements and results. The contrat plan is more of a legal document, at least in formal terms, than the other two. None of the three models, however, provides any sanctions in case of a violation of the contract by the governments. Although the Indian and Pakistani PCs appeared to be more successful than the Senegalese contracts, the relationship between financial performance and performance contracts remains far from conclusive. In all the three countries, the contracts have failed to provide a single window through which government-enterprise interface can be effectively managed. Thus the problem of multiple principals and single agents remains unresolved.